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Percolation of attack with tunable limited knowledge
Yilun Shang
Department of Computer and Information Sciences,
Northumbria University, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 8ST, UK
Percolation models shed a light on network integrity and functionality and have numerous ap-
plications in network theory. This paper studies a targeted percolation (α-model) with incomplete
knowledge, where the highest degree node in a randomly selected set of n nodes is removed at each
step and the model features a tunable probability that the removed node is instead a random one.
A ‘mirror image’ process (β-model), in which the target is the lowest degree node, is also investi-
gated. We analytically calculate the giant component size, the critical occupation probability and
the scaling law for percolation threshold with respect to the knowledge level n under both models.
We also derive self-consistency equations to analyze the k-core organization including the size of
k-core and its corona in the context of attacks under tunable limited knowledge. These percolation
models are characterized by some interesting critical phenomena and reveal profound quantitative
structure discrepancies between Erdős-Rényi networks and power-law networks.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
Network science has proven of incredible ability to
study the structure, dynamics and function of networked
systems across the sciences. Resilience (robustness) plays
a crucial role in natural and man-made complex systems,
where the interconnection topology underpinning their
proper functionality is subject to varied kinds of fail-
ures and attacks [1–3]. Scale-free networks, for exam-
ple, are shown to be fragile under attacks targeted at
hub nodes while remain robust against random attacks
in terms of the relative size P∞ of giant component or
cluster in the network [4]. Percolation models describing
the structural and topological properties of clusters have
been widely used for understanding and evaluating the
network resilience. Single networks under ordinary node
and bond percolation undergo a continuous phase tran-
sition at some critical occupation probability pc [3, 5],
while percolation over networks of networks often causes
cascading failures yielding an abrupt first-order phase
transition [6]. Many modified percolation strategies such
as L-hop percolation [7], bootstrap percolation [8, 9] and
localized percolation [10, 11], have been studied in com-
plex networks motivated by different practical limitations
and applicable scenarios.
Much work has focused on intentional attacks at nodes
with highest degree or other centrality measures assum-
ing complete knowledge of the network [4, 5, 12–14].
However, one realistic restriction that should be imposed
on many attackers is their limited ability to observe full
information of the entire network. For example, cy-
ber criminals on the internet can only probe the status
of some servers and routers and immunization decision-
makers during an epidemic such as COVID-19 are not
able to trace social contacts of each individual in a pop-
ulation [15]. Liu et al. [16] recently studied an attack
strategy under limited knowledge, where only degrees of
n nodes are observed at each time and the most con-
nected one is removed. Under this framework, taking
n as the network size recovers the traditional targeted
attack and the other extremal case of n = 1 yields the
random attack scenario.
Despite these advances, we still lack understanding of
how incomplete knowledge of the network during an at-
tack can affect the network robustness. Here, we develop
theoretical frameworks for understanding attack strate-
gies with limited knowledge covering not only the benefit-
oriented scenario in [16] but a cost-oriented model, where
the least connected node among the n randomly observed
nodes is removed. Attack cost has been proposed to be
positively correlated with node degree in [17]. In this
context, aiming at low-degree nodes can effectively lower
the attacker’s cost. Network dismantling strategies min-
imizing attack cost have been extensively studied under
a variety of practical considerations during the last years
[18–21]. Moreover, our framework features a tunable ex-
tent of orientation, meaning that at each round of attack,
the cost-oriented attacker removes the least connected
node among the n observed ones with probability α and
a random node otherwise (α-model), and similarly the
benefit-oriented attacker can choose the most connected
node among the observed ones with probability β and a
random node otherwise (β-model). We investigate how
percolation under tunable limited knowledge influences
the giant component P∞, the critical threshold pc and
derive analytical relations for the percolation threshold
with respect to the knowledge level n in both models for
networks with arbitrary degree distributions.
Apart from the giant component fraction P∞, another
important functional component of a network is its k-core
[22]. The k-core of a network is defined as the largest
subgraph with all node degrees no less than k. It can
be obtained by recursively peeling off nodes with degree
less than k from the remaining network. Unlike ordinary
percolation, k-core structure emerges at the criticality
discontinuously for k ≥ 3 [23, 24], resembling features of
a cascading failure. As an important centrality measure
quantifying number of interconnections, k-core has found
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numerous applications in ecological, social, and financial
systems [22, 25, 26] and some generalizations have been
proposed [27, 28]. We here further investigate the k-
core subgraph organization of our α- and β-models under
attack with limited knowledge. The studied properties
include the relative size of k-core Nkc, the average degree
Dkc of k-core, as well as the relative size of corona Nk(k),
which is a subgraph of k-core and has degree exactly
k within the k-core [24]. In all cases, our theory has
good agreement with simulation results, and we observe
distinct qualitative characteristics of percolation phase
transition and k-core organization for Erdős-Rényi (ER)
and power-law (PL) networks.
II. PERCOLATION UNDER TUNABLE
LIMITED KNOWLEDGE
We consider a random network G(V,E), where V rep-
resents the node set and E is the edge set. Let |V | = N
be the number of nodes in the network, which has a de-
gree distribution P (q) following the configuration model
[3]. At time step t = 0, we denote by P (q; 0) = P (q) the
initial degree distribution for a random node. The gen-




q and the corresponding generating




where G′0(1) = 〈q〉 represents the mean degree of a node
in G(V,E) [5]. Moreover, given probability P (q), the
cumulative distribution, namely the probability that a
randomly chosen node has degree at most q, is seen to
be given by F (q; 0) = F (q) =
∑q
s=0 P (s) for q ≥ 0.
A. Analytical framework for α-model
Given α ∈ [0, 1], the cost-oriented attacker at each
time step is assumed to observe n random nodes in our
α-model. We remove the one with lowest degree with
probability α and remove a random node of them with
probability 1−α. This process continues until a fraction
of 1 − p nodes are removed from G(V,E). Clearly, the
parameter α quantifies the degree of cost-orientation of
the attacker. The case of α = 1 corresponds to the most
conservative attack and the case of α = 0 is the same
as random attack because removing a random node from
the n randomly observed nodes is the same as attacking
a random node from the whole network.
To determine the relative size P∞ of the giant compo-
nent and the critical value pc, we assume that only nodes
are deleted but the edges linking the removed nodes to
the remaining network are kept intact. We will delete
these edges in a later stage. Formally, let P (q; t) be the
degree distribution of a random node in the remaining
network at step t ≥ 0. Following the idea of [16], we
will make use of the associated cumulative distribution
F (q; t) =
∑q
s=0 P (s; t), namely, the probability that a
randomly chosen remaining node at step t has degree no
more than q.
With the help of minimum order statistics for n inde-
pendent random variables (e.g. [29, Thm. 8.1]), the de-
gree distribution Pmina (q; t) of the observed lowest-degree
node at time step t is
[1 − (1 − F (q; t))n] − [1 − (1 − F (q − 1; t))n]
=∆ (1 − (1 − F (q; t))n) = −∆((1 − F (q; t))n) , (1)
for q ≥ 0, where ∆ represents the difference operator
with respect to q. We set F (−1; t) = 0 for all t. By
the definition of α-model, the degree distribution of the
attacked node at step t is
Pa(q; t) =αPmina (q; t) + (1 − α)P rana (q; t), (2)
where P rana (q; t) = P (q; t) = ∆F (q; t) is the probability
of choosing a random node of degree q. Let N(q; t) be the
number of nodes of degree q in the remaining network at
step t. With one more node being attached, we obtain
N(q; t + 1) = N(q; t) − Pa(q; t) (3)
by recalling the assumption that we only delete nodes
but not edges.




=α∆((1 − F (q; t))n) − (1 − α)∆F (q; t)
=(N − t)∂P (q; t)
∂t
− P (q; t) (4)
since N(q; t) = (N − t)P (q; t). Hence,
∆
(
− F (q; t) + (N − t)∂F (q; t)
∂t
− α(1 − F (q; t))n + (1 − α)F (q; t)
)
= 0. (5)
Recalling F (−1; t) = 0 for t ≥ 0, we obtain from (5) that
for q ≥ 0, (N − t)
∂F (q;t)
∂t = α(1 − F (q; t))
n + F (q; t)
−(1 − α)F (q; t) − α, t > 0,
F (q; 0) = F (q).
(6)
For n > 1, by directly integrating (6) we obtain the so-
lution
F (q; t) =1 −
(






Noticing that (1 − p)N = t, we rewrite (7) as
Fp(q) = 1 −
(





which is the cumulative distribution of the degree of a
random node when a 1− p fraction of nodes are removed
(with all edges intact) in the α-model. In the case of
n = 1, it is easy to verify that the solution of the system
(6) becomes Fp(q) = F (q) for any α ∈ [0, 1] as one would
expect through taking the limit n → 1+ in (8). Moreover,
when α = 0, we recover the random attack scenario from
(8), namely Fp(q) = F (q) for any n ≥ 1.
Hence, the probability of a randomly chosen node in
the remaining network having degree q, when a fraction of
1−p nodes are removed (but no edge is deleted), becomes
Pp(q) = ∆Fp(q) = Fp(q) − Fp(q − 1). (9)
Let u be the probability that an edge does not connect
to the giant component. Then





R(q)(1 − uq−1), (10)
where R(q) is the probability that a node is in the re-
maining network given it has degree q. Since P (q)R(q) =
pPp(q), thanks to (10) we obtain




qPp(q)(1 − uq−1). (11)





P (q)R(q)(1 − uq) = p
∞∑
q=0
Pp(q)(1 − uq), (12)
where u is obtained by solving (11). The critical point pc
occurs when (11) starts to have solution u < 1. Equating
the derivatives of both sides of (11) at u = 1 gives the




q(q − 1)Ppc(q). (13)
Next, we determine the scaling law of the critical value
pc in the limit of n → ∞. Let p̂c = pc(n → ∞). For
α > 0, the critical occupation probability behaves as (see
Appendix A)




















where q2 is the smallest degree satisfying F (q) ≥ 1 − p̂αc
and q1 = q2 − 1. The coefficient A in the higher-




α−1q1q2 − 〈q〉(α − 1)p̂cα−2
)
and the
decay rate η̂ = minq{|α ln p̂c − ln(1 − F (q))|}. Remem-
bering the definitions of q1 and q2, it is clear that the
minimum rate η̂ is attained at q = q1 or q = q2 since
F (q) is monotonic. q3 is taken as the q that attained the
minimum rate η̂.
When α = 0, we can readily recover the random attack
scenario with pc independent of n. In fact, taking α = 0
we have F (q2) = 0 with q2 = qmin − 1, where qmin means










which reproduces the classical result of node percolation
[5, Eq. (12)].
B. Analytical framework for β-model
In the β-model we will instead consider a benefit-
oriented attacker who will observe n random nodes at
each step and remove the one with highest degree (with
probability β) or a random one (with probability 1− β).
We run the process until a fraction of 1 − p nodes are
deleted from the network G(V,E).
Similarly as the above section, we will first assume
that only nodes are removed but the edges connecting
the removed nodes to the remaining network are kept
intact. Recall the cumulative distribution at time t is
F (q; t) =
∑q
s=0 P (s; t). Using maximum order statistics
for n independent random variables (e.g. [29, Thm. 8.1]),
the degree distribution of the observed highest-degree
node at step t is
Pmaxa (q; t) = ∆(F (q; t)
n), (17)
for q ≥ 0. An alternative method for deriving (17) is also
presented in [16]. We set F (−1; t) = 0 for all t as before.
By the definition of β-model, the degree distribution of
the attacked node at step t is
Pa(q; t) =βPmaxa (q; t) + (1 − β)P rana (q; t), (18)
where P rana (q; t) = P (q; t) = ∆F (q; t) is the probability
of choosing a random node of degree q. Following the
similar line in Section II.A, we obtain the dynamical sys-
tem of the cumulative distribution as (N − t)
∂F (q;t)
∂t = −βF (q; t)
n + F (q; t)
−(1 − β)F (q; t), t > 0,
F (q; 0) = F (q).
(19)
for all q ≥ 0.
When n > 1, by directly integrating (19) we derive the
solution
F (q; t) =
(







Inserting (1 − p)N = t into (20) gives rise to
Fp(q) =
(
1 + (F (q)1−n − 1)pβ(n−1)
)− 1n−1
, (21)
which characterizes the cumulative distribution of the de-
gree of a randomly chosen node when a 1 − p fraction of
nodes are removed (with all edges intact) in the β-model.
When n = 1, by taking the limit n → 1+ in (21), we re-
produce Fp(q) = F (q) for any β ∈ [0, 1]. The special case
of β = 0 also leads to Fp(q) = F (q) for any n, namely
the ordinary random attack scenario.
With the same reasoning as in Section II.A, we derive
the self-consistency equation (11) for u, the probability
of a random edge not connecting to the giant compo-
nent, and the formula (12) for P∞, the relative size of
giant component. In (11) and (12) here, the probabil-
ity of a node to be occupied in the remaining network
Pp(q) = ∆Fp(q) will be fed by (21). The critical occupa-
tion probability pc is then determined by (13).
Next, we examine the behavior of the critical value pc
in the limit of n → ∞. Likewise, let p̂c = pc(n → ∞).
For β > 0, the critical occupation probability evolves as
(see Appendix B)




















where q1 is the largest degree satisfying F (q) ≤ p̂βc
and q2 = q1 + 1. The constant coefficient B in the




β−1q1q2 − 〈q〉(β − 1)p̂cβ−2
)
and the decay
rate θ̂ = minq{|β ln p̂c − lnF (q)|}. In view of the mono-
tonicity of the F (q), the minimum rate θ̂ is attained at
q = q1 or q = q2. q3 is taken as the q that attained the
minimum rate θ̂.
In the special case of β = 0, we reproduce the random
attack scenario with pc independent of n. Since q1 =









which again reproduces the classical node percolation for-
mula [5, Eq. (12)] similarly as in our α-model with α = 0.
C. Results for synthetic networks
We test our theory in Section II.A and II.B numerically
for Erdős-Rényi (ER) networks and power-law (PL) net-
works over N = 107 nodes [3]. We consider ER networks
featuring a Poisson degree distribution P (q) = e−λλq/q!
for q ≥ 0 and mean degree 〈q〉 = λ = 5. The PL net-
works considered here follow P (q) ∝ q−γ with the degree
exponent γ = 2.2, minimum degree qmin = 1 and a cutoff
qcut = 3000.

















































































FIG. 1: (a) The relative size of giant component P∞ for ER networks with 〈q〉 = 5 and N = 107 as a function of occupation
probability p. The points are numerical simulations for α-model with n = 2 (gradient red (upper) circles) and n = N
(gradient red (upper) diamonds) ranging from α = 1, 0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.2; β-model with n = 2 (gradient (lower) blue squares) and
n = N (gradient blue (lower) pentagrams) ranging from β = 1, 0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.2. Magenta (middle) triangles are for the case
of α = β = 0 (n = 1). (b) The critical threshold pc as a function of n similarly for α-model (gradient red (lower) circles)
and β-model (gradient blue (upper) squares) ranging from α = 1, 0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.2 and β = 1, 0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.2, respectively. (c)
The scaling S as a function of n for α-model with α = 1, 0.5 (gradient red circles) and β-model with β = 1, 0.5 (gradient blue
squares). Solid curves are analytical results.
The results for ER networks and PL networks are
shown in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, respectively. As can be
seen, the agreement between theory and simulations is
excellent for both α-model and β-model. The degree
of both cost-orientation (α) and benefit-orientation (β)
shows a diminishing marginal effect when evolved from
0 to 1. For example, for n = 40 in Fig. 1(b), an in-
crease from β = 0 to β = 0.2 boosts the critical thresh-
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old pc by around 0.12, while an increase from β = 0.8
to β = 1 only pushes it up by around 0.05. Moreover,
at any degree of cost-orientation or benefit-orientation,
only a relatively small level of knowledge (n) is needed
to achieve the effect close to a target attack (i.e. n ∼ N);
typically α-model enjoys a smaller n than β-model. For
example, to approximate targeted attacks, n is required
to be around 10 for β-model and just about a half for α-
model in ER networks. For PL networks as shown in Fig.
2(b), the difference is much more prominent: n should be
around 50 for β-model but virtually 1 for α-model since
the random attack admits pc ∼ 0. It is found that the
influence of cost-orientation (α) and benefit-orientation
(β) is roughly comparable for ER networks due to the
homogeneity of degree (see Fig. 1(a) and Fig. 1(b)).
However, in PL networks the increase of β dramatically
harms the network integrity especially for larger n (see
the inset of Fig. 2(a) and Fig. 2(b)) as hubs in these
networks play a cohesive role in connecting nodes to the
giant component.
The behavior of scaling law for S := |pc − p̂c| with
respect to n is shown in Fig. 1(c) for ER networks and
in Fig. 2(c) for PL networks, respectively. As one would
expect from (14) and (22) that S evolves as n−1 for small
n. In Fig. 2(c) only β-model is displayed since pc =
p̂c ∼ 0 for any α and B = 0 in (22) for the PL networks
considered here.





























































FIG. 2: (a) The relative size of giant component P∞ for PL networks with γ = 2.2, qmin = 1, qcut = 3000 and N = 10
7 as a
function of occupation probability p. The points are numerical simulations for α-model with n = 2 (gradient red (upper) circles)
and n = N (gradient red (upper) diamonds) ranging from α = 1, 0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.2; β-model with n = 2 (gradient blue (lower)
squares) and n = N (gradient blue (lower) pentagrams) ranging from β = 1, 0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.2. Magenta (middle) triangles are
for the case of α = β = 0 (n = 1). (b) The critical threshold pc as a function of n similarly for β-model (gradient blue squares)
ranging from β = 1, 0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.2. For α-model, pc = 0 constantly. (c) The scaling S as a function of n for β-model with
β = 1, 0.5 (gradient blue squares). Solid curves are analytical results.
III. k-CORE OF A NETWORK UNDER
TUNABLE LIMITED KNOWLEDGE
In this section, we develop a unified analytical frame-
work to deal with the k-core of our α- and β-models. The
k-core is viewed as the infinite (k − 1)-ary subtree in the
network, where a k-ary tree admits at least k branches
at each node [23].
A. Theory
Recall in Section II we start with a configuration model
G(V,E) with degree distribution P (q) and delete nodes
according to α- and β-models but keeping edges connect-
ing to remaining nodes intact. The resulting degree dis-
tribution is Pp(q) = Fp(q) − Fp(q − 1) with Fp(q) given
by (8) for α-model and (21) for β-model. Define the gen-
erating function as G̃0(x) =
∑∞
q=0 Pp(q)x
q and the mean
degree is calculated by 〈q(p)〉 =
∑∞
q=0 qPp(q) = G̃
′
0(1).
In the next stage, we will remove these edges. Note
that the configuration model is randomly connected, and
the probability of a random edge leading to a remaining
node is equivalent to the ratio of the number of edges
leaving the remaining nodes to the total number of edges








Removing the edges leading to a deleted node is on a
par with removing randomly a 1 − p̃ fraction of edges of
the remaining nodes in a randomly connected network.
Mimicking the bond percolation in [30], we obtain the
generating function of the remaining nodes under attack
with tunable limited knowledge as




where p̃ is given in (25) and P (q) characterizes the prob-
ability of a randomly chosen node having degree q in
the resulting network, which we will denote by G(V , E).
Apparently, we have |V | = pN . Moreover, in the case
of n = 1, we know that Fp(q) = F (q) and Pp(q) = P (q)
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for any α or β (again depending on whether we con-
sider α-model via (8) or β-model via (21)). Accordingly,
G̃0(x) = G0(x), and p̃ = p by (25). The generating func-
tion (26) reduces to G0(x) = G0(1− p + px), which is in
line with the ordinary random attack framework [30].
With (26) at hand, we now study the k-core structure
of G(V , E) following the idea of [23, 24, 31]. We first
consider the relative size, Nkc, of k-core. To this end,
let z be the probability that an end node of a random
edge is the root of an infinite (k − 1)-ary tree. The self-















where qP (q)/〈q〉 is the probability of q − 1 out-reaching
edges of the end node and the binomial coefficient thingy
explains that s out of these q − 1 neighbors must belong
to the infinite subtree. A node is in the k-core indicates
that it has at least k neighbors in the infinite subtree.















Employing the generating function formalism with the s-





[3, 5], we rewrite (27) and (28) as















0 (1 − z)
s!
, (30)
where we use 〈q〉G = G
′
0(1), the mean degree of G, to
differentiate from the mean degree of G, 〈q〉.
An important subgraph of k-core is called corona,
which is a subset of nodes having degree k in the k-core
[23, 24]. The relative size of corona is denoted by Nk(k).
More generally, for q ≥ k, we define Nk(q) as the fraction









zq(1 − z)s−q, (31)
where s represents the degree of such a node in G. With




0 (1 − z)
k!
. (32)
As a byproduct, we can also derive the mean degree, Dkc,














0 (1 − z)
(q − 1)!
. (33)
B. Results for synthetic networks
The same ER and PL networks as those in Section
II.C are considered here for the study of k-core in Fig. 3
and Fig. 4, respectively. Fig. 3 shows the relative size
of k-core Nkc and the relative size of corona Nk(k) for
ER networks for the two cases of k = 2 and k = 3 with
various parameters α, β, and n. The counterpart results
for PL networks are shown in Fig. 4. An overarching
observation is that for both α- and β-models with general
n, k = 3 remains the watershed for k-core percolation
[22, 23], namely, Nkc shows a continuous phase transition
for k < 3 while k-core for k ≥ 3 emerges discontinuously.







































































































FIG. 3: The relative size of k-core Nkc with (a) k = 2 and
(b) k = 3 for ER networks with 〈q〉 = 5 and N = 107 as
a function of occupation probability p. The points are nu-
merical simulations for α-model with n = 2 (gradient red
(upper) circles) and n = N (gradient red (upper) diamonds)
ranging from α = 1, 0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.2; β-model with n = 2 (gra-
dient blue (lower) squares) and n = N (gradient blue (lower)
pentagrams) ranging from β = 1, 0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.2. The corre-
sponding relative size of corona Nk(k) similarly with (c) k = 2
and (d) k = 3 as a function of p. Magenta (middle) triangles
are for the case of α = β = 0 (n = 1). Solid curves are
analytical results.
The relative sizes of corona and k-core display a some-
what unexpected inconsistency for ER networks with re-
spect to α- and β-models. When the occupation prob-
ability p is relatively large (p > 0.5 for example in Fig.
3(c)), the corona takes up a larger proportion in the k-
core for β-model than α-model although the k-core size
in β-model is smaller than that in α-model. Interestingly,
PL networks do not display such phenomena (c.f. Fig. 4).
This raises a caveat that, in the early stage of attacks, a
benefit-oriented attacker can make an ER network fairly
‘unstable’ (compared to a cost-oriented attacker) in the
sense of producing a smaller k-core and a more signifi-
cant portion of the k-core being its corona. The loss of
7
central nodes under benefit-oriented attacks with limited
knowledge in ER networks could be more detrimental to
network structure than expected as the nodes in corona
are the weakest in the k-core.
















































































FIG. 4: The relative size of k-core Nkc with (a) k = 2 and (b)
k = 3 for PL networks with γ = 2.2, qmin = 1, qcut = 3000 and
N = 107 as a function of occupation probability p. The points
are numerical simulations for α-model with n = 2 (gradient
red (upper) circles) ranging from (a) α = 1, 0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.2
and (b) α = 1, 0.5; β-model with n = 2 (gradient blue (lower)
squares) ranging from (a) β = 1, 0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.2 and (b) β =
1, 0.5. The corresponding relative size of corona Nk(k) with
(c) k = 2 and (d) k = 3 as a function of p. Magenta (middle)
triangles are for the case of α = β = 0 (n = 1). Solid curves
are analytical results.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have developed the theory of perco-
lation under tunable limited knowledge featuring both a
cost-oriented attacker (α-model) and a benefit-oriented
attacker (β-model). The limited ability to observe the
network structure is relevant in many realistic scenarios
and much coveted. We analytically solve the giant com-
ponent size and critical percolation thresholds for un-
correlated networks with arbitrary degree distributions.
We systematically derive the scaling law for the critical
percolation threshold with respect to the level of knowl-
edge n for both models. In addition, we study the k-core
percolation in the context of tunable limited knowledge,
and show how these attacks affect the k-core structure
including the size of k-core and its corona. It is found
that the structure discrepancy between ER and PL net-
works profoundly influences both the giant component
based percolation phase transition and their k-core orga-
nization.
Appendix A: Asymptotic behavior of pc for α-model
as n → ∞
To determine the asymptotic behavior of pc from (13),
we will first examine that of Fp(q) from (8). Write
Fp(q) = F̂p(q)+δp(q), where constant F̂p(q) is the leading
term and δp(q) is vanishing as n → ∞.
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)− 1n
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pαn
)}













e−n(α ln p−ln(1−F (q))). (A1)
For 1 − F (q) → pα satisfying pα/(1 − F (q)) → 1, set
ξ = 1−pα/(1−F (q)). Since (pα/(1−F (q)))n = (1−ξ)n ∼
e−nξ ∼ 1 − nξ, we obtain
Fp(q) ∼1 −
(


















































1 − F (q)
)
. (A2)























e−n(ln(1−F (q))−α ln p). (A3)
When F (q) = 0, clearly we have Fp(q) = 0.
Therefore, the leading term of Fp(q) is expressed as
F̂p(q) ∼
{
0, pα < 1 − F (q),
1 − 1−F (q)pα , 1 − F (q) < p
α,
(A4)
and the vanishing term
δp(q) =
{
0, F (q) = 0,
1
ne
−η(q)n, F (q) > 0, (A5)
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where the decay rate is η(q) = |α ln p − ln(1 − F (q))|.
With the above exponential convergence of the dis-
tribution Fp(q), we then analyze the convergence of
the critical occupation probability pc. Define q1 =
max1−F (q)>pα q and q2 = min1−F (q)≤pα . By (13), (A4)































Let p̂c = limn→∞ pc and decompose pc as pc = p̂c + δc,
where p̂c is the constant leading term and the next term






















where Â = 2p̂cα/
(
αp̂c
α−1q1q2 − 〈q〉(α − 1)p̂cα−2
)
. In
view of (A5) and the monotonicity of F (q), we see that
the dominant decay rate is given by η̂ = minq{|α ln p̂c −
ln(1 − F (q))|}, where the optimum is attained at q1 or
q2. Putting all bits together, we obtain for α-model




as n → ∞, where q3 is taken as the q that attained the
minimum rate η̂.
Appendix B: Asymptotic behavior of pc for β-model
as n → ∞
In our β-model we will similarly start with the analysis
of Fp(q) from (21). Write Fp(q) = F̂p(q) + εp(q), where
constant F̂p(q) is the leading term and εp(q) is vanishing
as n → ∞.







































e−n(β ln p−ln F (q)). (B1)
For F (q) → pβ such that pβ/F (q) → 1, set ζ = 1 −














































































= 1 − 1
n
e−n(ln F (q)−β ln p). (B3)
For F (q) = 1, we have Fp(q) = 1.





, F (q) < pβ ,
1, F (q) > pβ ,
(B4)




−θ(q)n, F (q) < 1,
0, F (q) = 1, (B5)
where the decay rate is θ(q) = |β ln p − lnF (q)|.
Next, we examine the convergence of the critical oc-
cupation probability pc. Define q1 = maxF (q)≤pβ q and

































Let p̂c = limn→∞ pc and decompose pc as pc = p̂c + εc,
where p̂c is the constant leading term and the next term






















where B̂ = 2p̂cβ/
(
βp̂c
β−1q1q2 − 〈q〉(β − 1)p̂cβ−2
)
. In
view of (B5) and the monotonicity of F (q), we con-
clude that the dominant decay rate is given by θ̂ =
minq{|β ln p̂c − lnF (q)|}, where the optimum is attained
at q1 or q2. Putting all pieces together, we have for β-
model




as n → ∞, where q3 is taken as the q that attained the
minimum rate θ̂.
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Complexity 2018, 9826243 (2018).
[18] A. Patron, R. Cohen, D. Li, and S. Havlin, Phys. Rev. E
95, 052305 (2017).
[19] S. Wandelt, X. Sun, D. Feng, M. Zanin, and S. Havlin,
Sci. Rep. 8, 13513 (2018).
[20] X.-L. Ren, N. Gleinig, D. Helbing, and N. Antulov-
Fantulin, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 116, 6554 (2019).
[21] A. Smolyak, O. Levy, I. Vodenska, S. Buldyrev, and
S. Havlin, Sci. Rep. 10, 16124 (2020).
[22] Y.-X. Kong, G.-Y. Shi, R.-J. Wu, and Y.-C. Zhang, Phys.
Rep. 832, 1 (2019).
[23] S. N. Dorogovtsev, A. V. Goltsev, and J. F. F. Mendes,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 96, 040601 (2006).
[24] A. V. Goltsev, S. N. Dorogovtsev, and J. F. F. Mendes,
Phys. Rev. E 73, 056101 (2006).
[25] F. Morone, G. D. Ferraro, and H. A. Makse, Nat. Phys.
15, 95 (2019).
[26] F. Zhang, Y. Zhang, L. Qin, W. Zhang, and X. Lin,
in Proc. 31st AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(AAAI Press, San Francisco, CA, 2017), pp. 245–251.
[27] N. K. Panduranga, J. Gao, X. Yuan, H. E. Stanley, and
S. Havlin, Phys. Rev. E 96, 032317 (2017).
[28] Y. Shang, Phys. Rev. E 101, 042306 (2020).
[29] H. Pishro-Nik, Introduction to Probability, Statistics, and
Random Processes (Kappa Research, Sunderland, MA,
2014).
[30] M. E. J. Newman, Phys. Rev. E 66, 016128 (2002).
[31] N. Azimi-Tafreshi, J. G.-G. nes, and S. N. Dorogovtsev,
Phys. Rev. E 90, 032816 (2014).
